Localisation in action?

Operationalising support to local leadership in Sulawesi

Front page photo credit: Karina

Acknowledgements

Localising our research partnership

The principles of localisation were operationalised during this research. The review was undertaken as part of an evolving partnership between the Pujiono Centre and Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG). The partnership was formed during a previous study on the localisation (see *'Charting the New Norm? Local Leadership in the First 100 Days of the Sulawesi Earthquake Response')* commissioned by the Pujiono Centre and led by HAG. For this review, the tables were turned, with Pujiono Centre acting as the lead agency and sub-contracting HAG. This was the Pujiono Centre's first direct contract with an international donor, and the first time it had sub-contracted a partner organisation.

Executive Summary

The Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami response has been a highly visible test case of how the global community is tracking against World Humanitarian Summit commitments to truly respect, empower and resource national and local actors. This report seeks to highlight how the government policy influenced response from the DRA and to some extent the SHO, and the broader humanitarian sector from an operational perspective, drawing upon reflections from different stakeholders.

Within the DRA mechanism, most funding was channeled through national affiliates of international organisations or national branches of international network partners who in turn work with national and local partners. Whilst this directed funding further towards the local level, there were many layers involved. 24% of the total DRA funding was committed to national and local partners. As such, whilst the government policy may have increased funding to local partners, the modalities largely remain unchanged, challenging commitments for funding to be channeled as directly as possible to local actors.

National and local actors in Central Sulawesi benefited from large volumes of locally-sourced funding from a range of emerging sources – there are implications and considerations for international donors bringing stringent requirements and comparatively smaller amounts of money.

There is evidence to suggest that some alternate approaches to partnerships are actively being pursued by international actors with a view to increasing capacity for local leadership in Indonesia, particularly at the national level. There is scope for further support to ensure that national actors can best work with their local partners to strengthen response capacity, and for partnerships between national and local actors to promote principle-based partnerships, including aligning with the Charter4Change. This review found that consortia and network-based models were critical for national and local actors in their responses, and support from international partners including DRA and SHO organisations should continue to pursue and strengthen these mechanisms over project based subcontracting arrangements. Whilst it may appear these models lengthen funding chains and are therefore more inefficient, these models were considered effective in mobilising shared resources, coordinating joint assessments and information sharing, measured decision making around best-placed responders and present opportunities for joint capacity strengthening initiatives and consolidated funding chains.

Coordination mechanisms reflected an increased focus on supporting locally led response, though not without challenges. There is scope to use lessons from Sulawesi to promote coordination reform alongside localisation commitments at the national level, and further refine the role of the AHA Centre at the regional level.

Various capacity strengthening initiatives were pursued within the DRA member network and partners prior to and immediately after the response. Whilst gaps have been identified that align with technical disaster management capabilities and broader organisational development priorities, there is a need for a specific focus at the individual organisation level to tailor approaches. Local actors would benefit from coordinated approaches to building capacity, in line with DRA Strategic priorities around shared capacity strengthening.

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Contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms

AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNPB	Badan Nasional Penaggulangan Bencana/ National Disaster Management Agency
BPBD	Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/ Local Disaster Management Agency
CARE NL	Care Netherlands
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRA	Dutch Relief Alliance
ERAT	Emergency Response Assessment Team
ERCB	Emergency Response Capacity Building consortium
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
IDNJR	Indonesia Joint Response
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LPTP	Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan (Indonesian national NGO)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PKPU	Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummah (Indonesian national NGO)
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia/Indonesian Red Cross
RTRR	Real Time Response Review
SHO	Cooperating Aid Agencies (public fundraising alliance of Netherlands based INGOs)
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
YEU	Yakkum Emergency Unit (Indonesian national NGO)

Introduction

On September 28th 2018 an earthquake of magnitude 7.4 struck central Sulawesi province, triggering a tsunami that struck Palu. The earthquake and tsunami were compounded by resulting liquefaction and landslides causing immense loss of life and damage across Central Sulawesi, killing 2,101 people, displacing 130,000 and causing an estimated USD 910 million in material damage.[1] This disaster followed the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Lombok on August 5th. The compounding disasters resulted in a strained response capacity across Indonesia.

In the days following the tsunami, on October 1st, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) issued the *Regulations for International NGOs aiming to provide Assistance in Central Sulawesi* (Table 1).[2] The regulations address the conduct of international organisations, including limiting their ability to directly manage implementation, personnel and access, and mandate local partnerships.[3] The GoI considers international organisations as those either *"within the scope or structure of the United Nations or that carry out the task representing the United Nations or international organisations"* or Foreign Non-governmental organisations that "*functionally organized international organisations that are free of and do not represent any government; or international organizations that are formed separately from countries where they are established'"[4]* These definitions do not clarify the classification of nationalised branches of international NGOs, as whilst they are representatives of international organisations, they are still locally registered.

Table 1: Regulations for International NGOs aiming to provide assistance in Central Sulawesi

1	Foreign NGOs are not allowed to go directly to the field. All activities must be conducted in partnership with local partners.
2	Foreign citizens who are working with local NGOs are not allowed to conduct any activity on the sites affected by disasters.
3	Foreign NGOs which have already procured/prepared relief items in Indonesia need to register their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies and receive approval to work with local partners in distributing aid.

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[1] HCT Indonesia. 2018. Humanitarian Country Team Situation Report #10. 10 December 2018

[2] Disaster Management Law 24/2007 Art. 7 (1c.) Provides that government may establish cooperation with an international agency in the management of a disaster, except in the case of an emergency, in which case international agencies may be allowed to proceed to the disaster site after reporting the number of their personnel, logistics, equipment and the targeted location. However, the BNPB regulations stipulate specific requirements for Central Sulawesi.

[3] BNBP regulations, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/bnpb_rules.pdf

[4] Government Regulation 23/2008; BNBP No. 22/2010

4	If the respective NGOs have not registered their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies, they are asked to register with BNPB before working with the affected population in the field.
5	Foreign NGOs wishing to provide aid can do so through the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) with the guidance of the related ministries/agencies or local partners.
6	Foreign NGOs who have deployed foreign personnel are to retrieve their personnel immediately.
7	Monitoring of foreign volunteers is required.
8	The delivery of relief items is being coordinated temporarily by BNPB through Makassar and Balikpapan.

The GoI directive was no surprise to many actors, particularly those well versed in response in Indonesia, but it challenged many international responders to rethink and re-evaluate their approaches. It proved a highly visible test case on how the global community is tracking against World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) commitments to truly respect, empower and resource national and local actors. Is the response in Central Sulawesi an example of a locally led response (notwithstanding its government-mandated nature) from which to draw lessons for the future? If so, what can be learned? What has worked well? What – if anything – could be applied in other response contexts?

The DRA Response

The Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA), a coalition of 16 humanitarian organisations funded through the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is committed to putting local actors at the heart of humanitarian responses, and this principle is central to DRA's 2017- 2021 strategic plan. Supported by a localisation working group, the localisation efforts of the DRA are guided by international initiatives. Ambitiously, localisation objectives to 2021 include increasing the proportion of funding going to local actors to 35%; minimising transaction costs to make funding flows more efficient; enhancing capacity strengthening (with a target of at least 5% of all response budgets by 2021); amplifying local voices; and promoting improved partnerships with local actors in conflict contexts. Preliminary findings of localisation efforts in recent DRA responses have shown some progress against objectives. The Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (SHO; the Foundation of Cooperating Aid Organisations) is a partnership of 11 aid organisations,[5] most of which are also members of the DRA. It is a cooperative effort of aid organizations to inform the public and mobilise humanitarian assistance to disaster affected people. Leveraging its cooperation with national public media as well as, when needs arise, the commercial media, SHO launches appeals, or Giro555, that usually lasts two to three months, and distributes the funds to organisations to deliver aid worldwide. SHO raised over EUR 15 million for the Sulawesi response.[6]

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[5] Member organisations are CARE NL, Cordaid Mensen in Nood, ICCO & Kerk in Actie, Dutch Red Cross, Oxfam, Plan International Nederland, Save the Children, Stitchting Vluchteling, Terre des Hommes, UNICEF Nederland and World Vision.

[6] https://giro555.nl/actions/nederland-helpt-sulawesi/

The DRA has two mechanisms, an acute crisis mechanism with an implementation period of 6 months and a 12 month protracted crisis mechanism. The Sulawesi response used the acute mechanism, in which localisation objectives are not specifically articulated. Localisation objectives are shared and not necessarily to be achieved per response. As such, the DRA as a whole report against progress towards funding and capacity building targets, rather than per program.

This study provides evidence about how the DRA response in Central Sulawesi contributed towards shared DRA objectives on localisation as well as its alignment with global commitments. This research builds upon the initial findings produced by HAG and the Pujiono Centre on the strengths and challenges of the localised elements of the response. This study sharpens the analysis to the operational modalities that challenged or supported locally-led response in the complex context of Sulawesi and provides recommendations that could be applied elsewhere in Indonesia and considered further afield.

Review scope and methodology

Purpose

The purpose of this study commissioned by the DRA is to collect data that will enable an **evidence-based analysis and conclusions** as to what extent and in what aspects the Sulawesi response has been a locally led response, and what according to key local, national as well as international actors the major implications and challenges of the regulation of GOI have been for effectiveness of the response.

Additional purpose is to **collect good practices and learnings** from the Sulawesi response that generate content to develop/ describe models of locally led responses that can be used to increase effectiveness of humanitarian response in the future for the use of both DRA and the wider humanitarian community.

Scope

The review sought to answer the following specific review questions (Table 2).

Table 2: Review questions

Funding flows and chains	Provide insight into **funding flows and chains** starting with DRA and SHO organisations and, depending on data availability, a broader picture for response over the first 6 months: who funded which actor? Are there examples of locally led funding? Do actors feel the regulations had implications for the financing of the response? What are actors' preferred financing modalities?
Implications of GoI regulations	How did international actors adapt to the GoI regulations? Are there innovative or best practice examples of support to locally led response? Describe and compare actors' perspectives on the implications (positive and negative) of the GoI regulations on the overall quality of response (as far as possible

	using informants who can compare with previous disasters in Indonesia): ○ timeliness of the response ○ quality: technical (SPHERE or GoI guidance Perka BNPB 7/2008) and core humanitarian standards ○ accountability to donors and beneficiaries ○ relationships with communities
Coordination	Did the **coordination** mechanisms at the regional, national and sub-national levels reflect or support locally led response? Were the coordination forums effective? What are the implications of the role of the AHA centre in the region vis-a-vis OCHA?
Partnerships	What can be learned from different **partnership approaches** between actors? How did international actors work with national actors, both those with ongoing relationships and those establishing partnerships during the response? How do partnerships align with C4C Principles of Partnership? Were there examples of national–national or national–local partnerships? If so, what can we learn from these? Were any burdensome requirements placed on national actors? Are there best practice examples of equitable partnerships?
Capacity	What **capacity gaps and capacity-strengthening (CS) needs** of local actors were observed by local actors themselves and by international actors? How were they addressed, and if not, why not? What CS in humanitarian aid had local actors received previously? Based on this response, what do local actors list as their priority for CS for the future?

Methodology

Figure 1: Methodology

Methodology

39 INTERVIEWS

4 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 28 PARTICIPANTS

27 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

43 SURVEY RESPONDENTS

1 LOCALLY-LED RESEARCH TEAM

The methodology used a largely qualitative approach. The data collection process combined stakeholder interviews with key representatives of DRA and SHO agencies and their partners, as well as other key humanitarian actors engaged in the response. Interviews were conducted in Palu, Jakarta and remotely with stakeholders in the Netherlands. Four focus group discussions were held, and over 27 documents read in desk review. A survey was devised and administered to representatives of organisations that received funding from the DRA and SHO to provide quantitative insights to complement the qualitative data collection.

Limitations

- The timeframe of the review was brief (16 days total) and the breadth of stakeholders and data available meant that some data could not be analysed in depth. As such, some of the findings, such as the analysis of funding flows, are presented at a high level rather than in detail.
- Some stakeholders, particularly those from local organisations, could not respond to specific questions on funding received from multiple sources. This prevented detailed mapping of funding flows across the entirety of the DRA and SHO members and their partners. Nonetheless, the data available gives considerable insight into funding flows and trends.
- Some of the questions referred to both DRA and SHO recipients, but not all SHO agencies were part of the data collection process. There is some overlap between agencies, but findings and recommendations are less applicable to the broad spectrum of SHO agencies than to agencies funded under the DRA mechanism.
- The research questions generated rich data, but also meant that data pertained to the general response environment as well as to DRA and SHO and their partners. This challenged the team in framing findings and recommendations relevant to the broad range of stakeholders in this review.
- Working definitions of 'local actor' were inconsistent across individuals and agencies, including between DRA members, and in some cases differed from the definition utilised for the purpose of this review (see definitions on page 11). Specifically, the trend of 'nationalisation' of international NGOs meant that organisations affiliated with international structures that had registered considered themselves to be national actors, despite this being inconsistent with global definitions. This hindered interpretation of some of the data, as noted in the findings below.

Definitions

This review employed the following definitions:

Localisation[7]: Local and national humanitarian actors increasingly empowered to take a greater role in the leadership, coordination and delivery of humanitarian preparedness and response in their countries.

Local and national non-state actors[8]: organisations engaged in relief that are headquartered and operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO.

National and sub-national state actors: State authorities of the affected aid recipient country engaged in relief, whether at local or national level

Internationally affiliated organisations: Organisations that are affiliated to an international organisation through inter-linked financing, contracting, governance and/or decision-making systems.[9]

Partnership: the relationship between international humanitarian actors (especially international NGOs) and local and national actors (especially local and national NGOs), whereby the international actors work with, support and resource their local and/or national partners to design and implement humanitarian preparedness and response programming.

DRA organisations: organisations that receive and channel funds from the Dutch Ministry, coordinated through the Joint Response Lead

SHO organisations: organisations that receive and channel funds mobilised from the public via the joint mechanism.

DRA and/or SHO partners: national organisations or networks that receive, utilise and/or further channel funds received from the direct recipients of DRA and SHO funding.

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[7] https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Accelerating%20Localisation%20Research%20Summary_Global.pdf

[8] IFRC Localisation Worksteam: *Identified categories for tracking funding flows*; http://media.ifrc.org/grand_bargain_localisation/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2018/06/categories_for_tracking_direct_as_possible_funding_to_local_and_national_actors_003.pdf

[9] IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, Localisation Marker Working Group Definitions Paper. 24 January 2018; https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hftt_localisation_marker_definitions_paper_24_january_2018.pdf

Findings

Impact of the GoI regulations

> Fifty per cent of international agencies felt that leadership was *less effective* due to the GoI regulations. Fifty-two per cent of national and local actors felt that leadership was about *as effective* as before the GoI regulations.

The GoI regulations affected international agencies, including members of the DRA and SHO, in different ways. There were different perceptions of how the government policy restricted international support, but broad agreement about the challenges associated with the speed with which the decision was made and its impact on organisations' ability to find other response modalities.

Several of the DRA and SHO member organisations operating in Indonesia are affiliates of international networks which have national registrations, such as World Vision Indonesia, Plan Indonesia and Save the Children Indonesia. CARE Indonesia was in the process of nationalising its registration during the response. For these actors, the primary challenge was in mobilising international surge to the field. For organisations that had been registered for some time in Indonesia, such as World Vision Indonesia and Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik, and thus acquired the status and privileges as 'national NGOs' and therefore not being required to work through partners, there was no significant change to their implementation modality or to their partnerships with local organisations for the DRA funding.[10]

"Sometimes national NGOs become local NGOs and [they] become strong competitors for local NGOs."[11] (national actor)

International organisations that prioritise working through partners –national with international affiliates or otherwise – reported some challenges and changes to ways of working related to the GoI regulations. These included in identifying new partners and supporting new and existing partners to manage larger volumes of funding than they had historically received. For example, the evolving Oxfam/JMK partnership model eventuated in JMK requesting Oxfam's support in leading the response as the scale - including managing the funding - was far larger than they had previously experienced. There has since been recognition of the need to enhance financial management within the partnership including in speed of transferring funds - assuring rapid response - and support to partners is managing financial risk.[12]

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[10] Interview 16

[11] FGD 1

[12] Interview 25

A representative from a UN agency spoke to the process of shared proposal development with the agency's new local partner. This involved using a simplified proposal format and approaching the process together rather than through the traditional funding solicitation model.[13] This projects a more proactive role of international actors to jointly assess the need, simplified its business process, and help local partners to submit project proposals to qualify for the selection, and in time, to be in better position to decide what and how to respond to the emergency. Examples such as this, when done in a way that complements and not undermines local actor capacity, demonstrate ways in which traditional requirements and processes can be adapted to better support locally led responses.

APPROACHES TO SURGE

At the outset of the response the regulations created some confusion in international organisations who had activated surge protocols to deploy human resources to Indonesia. This led to some rigorous internal dialogue and sometimes tension between head offices in the field over how to provide assistance whilst adhering to the GoI directive.

"[The] normal procedure is that people are in-country…[there was] incredible frustration, always a lack of information...there's a challenge doing it by distance."[14] (international actor)

International partners employed different approaches to surge to overcome the restrictions on their staff. For example, some organisations redeployed Indonesian staff from other locations to strengthen capacity at the field level, overcoming some of the challenges reported by many actors in recruitment of experienced humanitarian responders. Other international actors, such as Oxfam and Save the Children, drew upon regional surge platforms to deploy staff from elsewhere within Asia rather than those from other regions.

One international partner referenced the use of remote support in proposal development, undertaking what was traditionally an in-country deployed function but from outside Indonesia.[15] Whilst this was not the intended modality, it was seen as an effective way to draw on support without the need to deploy someone to Indonesia, and possibly a modality that could be strengthened or institutionalised.

"Remote support and advisory – this is a model to work towards – most of the Asian countries will use this sort of model to strengthen their capacity in their own country and say no to international aid." (international actor)[16]

Indonesia lacks consolidated shared platforms. DRA and SHO agencies could learn from models piloted by the START Network's Transforming Surge Capacity project on shared approaches to surge at the national and local level to ensure the availability of qualified staff within existing networks. DRA and SHO organisations should consider further institutionalising arrangements for remote surge support to mitigate challenges in future responses.

[13] FGD 4

[14] Interview 26

[15] Interview 26

[16] Interview 27

Timeliness

"Why do you impose so many rules just to distribute the relief, while the needs are real, right there, aplenty?"[17] (national actor)

Figure 2: Perceptions of response timeliness compared with previous responses

Perceptions on response **timeliness** compared with previous responses

Assessment, Planning and design

International
- Much faster — 22.22%
- Somewhat faster — 33.33%
- The same — 22.22%

National
- Much faster — 34.78%
- Somewhat faster — 39.13%
- The same — 17.39%

Mobilising Resources

International
- Much faster — 33.33%
- Somewhat faster — 22.22%
- The same — 22.22%

National
- Much faster — 34.78%
- Somewhat faster — 30.43%
- The same — 30.43%

Implementation

International
- Much faster — 11.11%
- Somewhat faster — 22.22%
- The same — 22.22%

National
- Much faster — 26.09%
- Somewhat faster — 43.48%
- The same — 21.74%

Overall, the response was perceived to be faster than previous responses in Indonesia despite the GoI regulations, with very few respondents feeling that the response was slower across assessment, planning and design; resource mobilisation or implementation.[18] Survey results showed a significant discrepancy in perceptions on implementation; 70% of National actors felt that implementation was somewhat or much faster than previous responses, compared with only 33% of international actors.

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[17] Interview 29

[18] Survey data, DRA RRTR Report

55% of international actors felt that resource mobilisation was much or somewhat faster than previous responses, compared with 64% of national actors. 73% of national actors felt that assessment, planning and design were faster than previous responses, compared with only 55% of international actors. These perceptions demonstrate a perceived improvement in timeliness, however that local actors felt things moved faster than their international counterparts.

Investment in local partnerships and capacity over many years has led to a range of consortia or network models that were able to rapidly mobilise assessment teams and funding. Coordination around local and national actor joint assessments was an integral factor in timely mobilisation. A range of joint assessments were conducted, including 'Joint Needs Assessment'[19]; 'Market Assessment in Central Sulawesi'[20]; 'Listening to Children[21]; Joint structural assessment of schools[22]; Joint assessment of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices related to WASH[23]; Joint gender assessment[24], and Comprehensive Gender Assessment[25].

INVESTMENT IN CONSORTIA FOR TIMELY RESPONSE

The Emergency Response Capacity Building (ERCB) Consortium was widely referenced as an effective model in timely locally led response. The consortium of 10 Indonesian-based organisations,[26] evolved from a capacity building project supported by Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and the Dutch INGO Cordaid in previous years. A protocol has been established through which seed funding can be drawn down (to a maximum of EUR 50,000) from Cordaid emergency funds to initiate a response. The protocol, established as part of the ongoing work of the Consortium, articulates that strategic decisions around which organisation is best to lead as the Focal Point Organisation, in which sectors and locations, are to be taken by a group of organisational Focal Point Personnel.[27] The ERCB was activated during the Sulawesi response under the LPTP's leadership and received an initial EUR 500,000 of response funding from Cordaid SHO funds, followed by an additional EUR 290,000 SHO funding from Cordaid for early recovery. The ongoing readiness of the ERCB consortium and its multi-agency structure and established protocols were vital to the ability to activate and respond quickly.

"[the response in Central Sulawesi] was faster because of participation of local and national humanitarian actors. In emergencies we [ERCB members]

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[19] October 2018 including CARE Indonesia, Caritas, CRS, Save the Children Indonesia and World Vision Indonesia
[20] December 2018 inlcuding WFP, Oxfam and World Vision Indonesia
[21] Including Plan Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia, Save the Children Indonesia and UNICEF
[22] Including UNICEF Save the Children Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia and Plan Indonesia
[23] World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam and YKMI
[24] Led by CARE
[25] Jointly conducted by UNFPA, UN Women, Plan International Indonesia, Oxfa and Ministry of PPPA
[26] Pusaka, Aman, Mitra Aksi, Bina Swadaya, Primari, Perkhaki, LPTP, Caritas, CRS and Cordaid
[27] Protocol Engagement of ERCP - Cordaid partners

have joint post disaster needs assessments."[28] (local humanitarian actor, member of ERCB)

In cases where partnerships did not previously exist, the process of finding new partners hampered the agencies' ability to rapidly respond.[29] Even in cases where partnership processes were adapted to expedite timeframes there were delays and some levels of strain placed on local actors to navigate multiple concurrent requests to partner.

"Many of the tasks are time-wasting. For example, capacity assessments, consultants' turnover, demand for repetitious information." (national actor) [30]

Quality

Both international and national and local humanitarian actors felt that the quality of the response was the same or better than in previous responses, as highlighted below in Figure 3. International actors felt that responsible resource management had remained the same as in previous responses, compared with 78% of national actors feeling it either somewhat or significantly improved. Nevertheless, several international actors mentioned challenges in being able to triangulate information from field reports in the early stages due to limitations on field access.[31] Many actors referenced adherence to Sphere standards, though the DRA Real Time Response Review (RTRR) highlighted some challenges in achieving technical quality standards. Actors consistently referenced working knowledge and application of community feedback and complaints mechanisms, but few mentioned operationalisation of Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS).[32] Application of CHS is considered to not be as progressed as Sphere, particularly as Sphere standards have been adapted by the GoI, whilst CHS has not. As highlighted in the RTRR there was evidence of accountability mechanisms being established at the field level, which was confirmed in interviews undertaken for this review, but monitoring and assurance of quality of mechanisms was variable amongst partners and programs. Communities largely used feedback mechanisms to request further assistance rather than to comment on quality of operations.

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[28] Interview 8

[29] Interviews 21, 22, 26, 28

[30] Interview 28

[31] Interviews 24, 26, 27

[32] Interviews 8, 5,

Figure 3: Perceptions of response quality compared with previous responses

Perceptions on response **quality** compared with previous responses

Aid is relevant to needs

International
- Significantly better — 11.11%
- Somewhat better — 55.56%
- Remains the same — 22.22%
- Deteriorated — 0%

National
- Significantly better — 39.13%
- Somewhat better — 39.13%
- Remains the same — 17.39%
- Deteriorated — 4.35%

Community participation

International
- Significantly better — 11.11%
- Somewhat better — 55.56%
- Remains the same — 22.22%
- Deteriorated — 0%

National
- Significantly better — 39.13%
- Somewhat better — 39.13%
- Remains the same — 17.39%
- Deteriorated — 4.35%

Accountability to affected populations

International
- Significantly better — 0%
- Somewhat better — 33.33%
- Remains the same — 44.44%
- Deteriorated — 0%

National
- Significantly better — 39.13%
- Somewhat better — 34.78%
- Remains the same — 17.39%
- Deteriorated — 8.7%

Responsible management of resources

International
- Significantly better — 0%
- Somewhat better — 11.11%
- Remains the same — 66.67%
- Deteriorated — 0%

National
- Significantly better — 39.13%
- Somewhat better — 39.13%
- Remains the same — 8.7%
- Deteriorated — 13.04%

17

Funding

The restrictions placed on international organisations directly implementing and needing to work through partners increased pressure on local and national actors to receive and program funding that for many far exceeded their absorption capacity. This was the case both for new and established partnerships, in which local and national actors were receiving funds from their international partners.[33] Many local and not always necessarily humanitarian actors were either saturated or overwhelmed and, in some cases, turned down the offers from international partners for funding.[34] For some of the larger national humanitarian actors, the complex and time-consuming process required to receive funds from international sources was incommensurate with funding volumes, particularly compared to the funding that they were able to mobilise locally.[35] The review showed that consortium and network-based models through which funding can be centralised channeled, were beneficial in supporting local partner responses and reducing the burden associated with managing multiple funding sources.[36]

> *"For local NGOs [it] is very hard to hold some projects from several donors.*
> *This needs attention."[37] (national actor)*

The DRA response in Sulawesi went some way in meeting localisation funding targets as outlined in the DRA Guidance Note on Localisation. As can be seen in Figure 4 below, drawn from the final IDNJR budget, 24% of the EUR 4 million total budget was committed to local partners, situated against a whole of DRA target to get to 25% by the end of 2019 and 35% by the end of the strategic period in 2021. This demonstrates significant advancement from the 2015–17 period, in which an average of 15% of funding per response was committed to local partners.[38] However, funding flows and chains remain largely unchanged, with multiple layers of funding in many cases, channeled from international donors. This is also the case with the SHO funding chains. 25% of the SHO funding was transferred to local partners[39] however the funding chains remained extensive with several instances involving four transaction layers.

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[33] FGD 3, interview 29

[34] Interview 28

[35] Interview 28

[36] Interviews 8, 13, 30, FGD 4

[37] FGD 3

[38] DRA Localisation report

[39] Annex C. SHO Funding Flows

"Local NGOs become weak because [they] receive [funding from] so many donors, but have no capacity. Large amounts of funding with limited time becomes a big problem, and it will be repeated."[40] (national actor)

Percentage of IDNJR funding committed to local partners

Total funding received

Joint Lead Budget 4%
CARE 12%
ZOA 11%
Cordaid 13%
World Vision 11%
Funding committed to local partners $941,402 24%
Oxfam 12%
Tearfund 13%
Plan International 10%
$4,000,000
Save the Children 14%

40% 10% 14% 85% 39% 3%

Figure 4: Percentage of funding committed to local partners

Funding requirements associated with receiving international donor funding, including through the DRA mechanism were also highlighted as challenging for some actors, particularly national actors. The pressure to spend within a short window was referenced by representatives from international, national and local actors as particularly challenging, particularly as many local actors were managing huge unprecedented levels of funding. Almost half (48%) of national and local actor respondents reported their funding for the Sulawesi response as one-off emergency funding,[41] which undermines predictability of funding for local actors and does not align with Charter for Change commitments around the provision of robust organisational support and capacity building.[42] Within the DRA, inability to absorb and expend within the acute window resulted in a 6-week extension granted across all DRA partners. By comparison, funds mobilised through the SHO are considered more flexible, with phase II

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[40] FGD 3

[41] Survey results

[42] https://charter4change.org/

finishing in September 2020. Whilst not being guided by strategic localisation commitments, the multi-year flexible modality did not come with the same pressures as funding via DRA.

Multiple factors influenced funding decisions, including DRA lead agencies considering the impact of donor requirements on their partners. One international actor, when considering disbursement of funding, chose to direct different sources of funding to different partners based on analysis of flexibility of funding requirements and perceived partner capacity to absorb and manage funding.

Emerging sources of local funding and non-traditional humanitarian donors played a significant role in the response, particularly for supporting local and national actor responses.[43] This demonstrates a future trend and possible shift in the role of international humanitarian financing. Many of the emerging funding streams that supported the response, such as Zakat[44], Infaq[45], Sadaqah[46] and Waqf[47] Islamic Financing, may not have stringent requirements for partners and are not necessarily always in alignment with Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship.[48] Whilst this enabled local partners to respond more flexibly than with other sources of funding, there is scope for international actors to share models of accountability for these streams and enhanced coordination with other funding mechanisms.

Profile: Locally mobilised funding

Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) is the sole official body formed by the government of Indonesia which has the duty and function of collecting and distributing zakat, infaq, and sadaqah at the national level.

Baznas deployed IDR 12.250 millions (USD 850,000) to the Central Sulawesi operation across immediate relief, search and rescue, transitional housing and economic recovery. The projects were implemented by Baznas' own arms both national and local offices as well as sectoral programmes, and in a few exceptional cases, implemented by NGO partners. The projection for 2019 Islamic financing collection by Baznas is around IDR 10 Trillion (USD 700 Million)[49] demonstrating the importance of this type of financing in future responses in Indonesia.

Figure 5 provides a snapshot of some of the funding mobilised for the response as reported on the OCHA Financial Tracking Service (primarily bilateral or multilateral funding commitments)[50], by ASEAN

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[43] Interviews 8, 28

[44] Zakat is a liability to be paid by all practicing Muslims who have the financial means as one of the five pillars of Islam upon specific belongings in a specific time to purify wealth

[45] Infaq is wealth spent as guided by Islam, strongly encouraged but not an obligation, for certain purposes including expiation and donation.

46 Shadaqah is a voluntary act that involves giving or donating especially to those in need.

47 Waqf is a voluntary, permanent, irrevocable dedication of a portion of ones wealth – in cash or kind – which fruits may be utilised for any Islamic Law -compliant purpose

48 24 Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship: https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html

49 Baznas, 2019, Laporan Program Respon dan Recovery Pasca bencana Gempa Bumi, Tsunami dan Likuifaksi Sulawesi Tengah, forthcoming; Baznas, 2019, Zakat Outlook 2019

50 https://fts.unocha.org/

members[51] and by Forum Zakat[52]. There are multiple challenges, however, with tracking funding contributions because reporting is not mandatory. This snapshot highlights that whilst international financing featured heavily in the response, locally and regionally mobilised funding played a significant role.

Figure 5: High-level snapshot of reported funding for Sulawesi response

High level snapshot of reported funding for Sulawesi response

Financial Tracking Service — 78%
Forum Zakat — 16%
ASEAN members — 6%
Total US 22 million

Recommendations - *Funding*

- International organisations seek opportunities to coordinate the response funding modalities at the field level in order to streamline and harmonise requirements for local and national partners, including examining how international funding supports or undermines funds mobilised locally.
- The DRA to consider establishing global targets for multi-year flexible funding for local and national actors in future activations, building in longer timeframes and phased funding

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51 ASEAN Member States' Response to Central Sulawesi Earthquake, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/02-October09-ASEANResponse%20Masterfile.pdf
52 https://forumzakat.org/. Forum Zakat is a 400-organsiation strong association that aims, amogn others, to facilitate the coordination, optimise the utilisation of zakat, builds members' capacities, standardize and accredita the Zakat Management Organisations.;

approaches. This could also be in the form of better coordination and phasing alongside SHO funding, including around capacity development for preparedness in recovery

- International organisations to continue to support local and national partners to be able to accept and absorb funding.
- National and local actors to advocate to international organisations and donors for more flexible requirements around funding – maintaining accountability but reducing administrative burden
- The DRA mechanism to consider options to reduce funding layers in a response. This includes providing clear parameters for funding to be provided 'as directly as possible' as outlined in the DRA Strategy 2018-2021, through increased reporting on the full chain of funding, and joint analysis of total funding being implemented by local actors
- Donors and GoI to explore a country-level pooled fund mechanism accessible for national and local actors that includes regulatory frameworks to govern the access eligibility, resource utilisation, and accountability
- International donors and national emerging financing mechanisms to seek opportunities to coordinate around Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles

Partnerships

"This is where I feel like we've moved into a more equitable capacity...where (international organization) brings in the technical lead and liaison with donors but they are a partner rather than a lead" (international actor)[53]

The Sulawesi response clearly demonstrated the roles of international actors were shifting, stepping to the side and supporting partners in mobilising and brokering funding, liaising with donors, providing technical support and strengthening capacity rather than leading on direct implementation.

There were significant differences in partnership approaches between agencies, both in terms of arrangements that pre-dated the response and those that were created in the immediate aftermath of the emergency. Agencies receiving funding from DRA align with the broad categories as outlined in the DEC Real Time Response Review; each modality was impacted differently in the response. Figure 6 on page 24 shows the scale and relationship between different partnership approaches for DRA lead agencies, showing that multiple approaches were taken, and the majority of partnerships were with existing local NGO partners. It also demonstrates the scale of the trend towards 'nationalization' of INGOs

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[53] Interview 25

Figure 6: Partnership arrangements for DRA Lead agencies

Partnership arrangements

Nationally established

Forming nationally

Existing local NGO partnership

Searching for local NGO partnerships

There were cases of DRA and SHO direct recipients working with the same partner organisations, and broader examples of this highlighted in other response review reports. The DEC Real-Time Response Review refers to the NGO 'marketplace' and points to the important cross-organisational learning that is possible for agencies that work with the same partners. For example, the Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU) is a partner for three DEC member agencies[54], as well as two DRA and SHO member agencies[55], as well as other sources of funding. In the case of two of the DRA and SHO organisations that chose to partner with the same organisation, discussions were had in advance to assess implementation capacity and mitigate the risks of overburdening the partner.[56] This dialogue could be broadened in future to bring together more international actors that have the interest to jointly explore such partnership, and involve the local partner in these discussions to reaffirm the commitment to transparency and equitable partnership dialogue, as well as identifying possible capacity gaps that need immediate addressing.

Partnerships that had been established before the response *(Existing local NGO partnership)* were more closely aligned to the Principles of Partnership[57] as reaffirmed in the Charter 4 Change (C4C). For example, Oxfam's longstanding partnership and support to JMK was instrumental in its response, enabling JMK to mobilise quickly despite funds not yet having been transferred for implementation, as

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[54] Action Against Hunger, Age International and Christian Aid

[55] Plan International NL and Tearfund NL

[56] Interviews 21, 26, 23

[57] The Principles of Partnership (2007) are Equality, Transparency, Results-Oriented Approach, Responsibility and Complementarity

their partnership was founded with trust as a core value.[58] However, some DRA and SHO agencies with longstanding partnerships in Indonesia still do not reference partnership principles in agreements and continue to operate on project-based funding models, both within the Sulawesi response and in other programs.[59] Such agreements would benefit from broader partnership dialogue and agreements that sit across project funding contracts and instill partnership principles, including in some cases those that align with C4C.

"Localisation is inevitable, but it has to be undertaken carefully, under the normal circumstances and not during emergency"[60] (National actor)

Consortium and network-based partnerships were incredibly effective in supporting local partners to rapidly respond and maximise skills and capacities across a range of local and national humanitarian actors, and leveraging support from international organisations. These networks promoted better preparedness, information sharing, comparative advantage analysis, and resource brokering between member agencies. For example, the Jakomkris network, which has been supported by Tearfund Netherlands for the past five years and has 38 registered member churches and organisations, was an instrumental network activated for the response. Six of the registered agencies responded, but through the network of relationships other partners have been able to augment the response of those on the ground in sectors including shelter, cash and health services.[61] Tearfund Netherlands funded YEU (a Jakomkris network member agency) through the DRA, and was one of more than 15 partners. YEU struggled to manage the high volumes of competing requests from multiple partners, despite having strong implementation capacity. Drawing upon global partnership guidance, Plan has standby arrangements with national and local partners including a six-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) covering emergency response with YEU and a two-year MoU with the Jakarta-based Yayasan Rebana. Such long-standing arrangements, particularly where there are capacity strengthening components, are good practice examples of how international actors can approach partnership based standby-arrangements for response.

"The ad hoc arrangement is burdensome to local actors, particularly when the international actors do not do their homework"[62] (National actor)

Partnerships that had not been established prior to the response were less likely to be underpinned by principles and more likely to be more traditional project-based, sub-contracting funding agreements. For

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[58] Interview 25, DEC RTRR

[59] Interview 27

[60] Interview 31

[61] Integral Alliance Newsletter, https://www.integralalliance.org/newsletter/integral-responding-sulawesi-earthquake-indonesia-update-q/

[62] Interview 28

example, whilst CARE had previously worked with their partner under the DRA (PKPU), they also pursued new partnerships with organisations and adapted their partner selection criteria to expedite the process. Due to time constraints these partnerships were largely focused on service delivery for the emergency phase, but there is now intention to undertake a more detailed capacity mapping exercise. The results will underpin longer-term support, with more of a strategic focus on capacity strengthening and partnership through the recovery phase.

Some national and local actors were overwhelmed by the multiple requests for new partners. Local actors reacted to the swell of requests in several different ways, including 1) broadening their portfolios to accommodate the surging international partnerships 2) leveraging their local network to cope with the partnership offers and 3) opting to receive only NFIs commodities to avoid burdensome monitoring and reporting requirements, and 4) declining new international partnerships, in some cases opting to receive locally-sourced funds (however not partnerships) that came with less stringent requirements.

There are examples outside of Indonesia that demonstrate how standby partnerships could be established to support local capacity and mitigate the risk of multiple partner requests in the aftermath of a disaster. In the Philippines, CARE has undertaken a partner mapping exercise across all parts of the country, applied standard MoUs for response partnering, and provided support for training in core areas.[63] This model could be applied in Indonesia to better prepare international and national partnerships for future responses.

Layers of Localisation - National - Local partnerships

"You don't have more capacity than us"

(national actor, referring to sentiments from their local partners)[64]

National humanitarian actors in Sulawesi assumed a role similar to that played by international organisations. This highlights both the emergence of strengthening civil society with humanitarian capacity within Indonesia and the advance of the humanitarian sector towards localisation objectives. Whilst this shift is positive, there were reports of tensions between national and 'local local' organisations in the Sulawesi response, including in pursuing project-based sub-contracting arrangements without long-term capacity strengthening and imposition of burdensome administrative and compliance requirements. In this shifting environment, national organisations are applying standards and compliance requirements such as Sphere and Child Protection to their local partners. There is scope for national partners to operationalise the Principles of Partnership to further promote localisation downstream, and avenues for international partners to support these emerging discussions.

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[63] Interview 26

[64] FGD 4

Recommendations – *Partnerships*

- International actors to continue to invest in strengthening humanitarian networks between national and local humanitarian actors in Indonesia and elsewhere as a preparedness measure to support more effective response
- International organisations without established partnerships in high-risk priority countries consider partner mapping and establishment of standing response agreements to mitigate local actors facing high volumes of requests for new partnerships in response
- National actors to pursue principles based long-term partnership models that align with the Principles of Partnership in their approaches with local actors
- International actors to support national actors in aligning with principles-based partnership approaches

Coordination

Coordination in Sulawesi was layered, and effectiveness varied. At the international level, BNPB requested the AHA Centre to support with coordination, assuming some of the traditional roles of UN OCHA, which retained some of its coordination mandate. At the national level, coordination mechanisms reflected principles of a locally led response, with government line ministries leading all the established clusters, conducted primarily in Bahasa (in some cases with English translation), and coordination support being provided by international cluster leads. The President appointed the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security as responsible at national level. Eight clusters were established, being: Health, Education, Logistics, Infrastructure and Facilities, Economy, Early Recovery, Search and Rescue, WASH and Displacement and Protection, which notably did not follow the structure as set out in the HCT response plan, which was a source of confusion for a range of actors.[65]

> *"[coordination is] run by Indonesian people, it uses Indonesian language, it feels and tastes Indonesian." (national actor)[66]*

At the Provincial level, the Governor was responsible for overall coordination, which was performed by the Permanent Executive Secretary (Sekda). Downstream management was the responsibility of the Chiefs of the affected districts and cities. The provincial government established a Command Centre (Posko) to make strategic decisions to be followed at district/city levels. The military joint command to manage the operations was attached to this Provincial Command Centre. BNPB established a National Support Centre (Pos Pendampingan Nasional/Pospenas) to align its services and those of national line ministries, with local priorities. BPBD has technical downward supervisory lines to the provincial and district/city level BPBDs that usually serve as the secretariat of the command centres.

Cluster meetings took place at the provincial-level in Palu. Provincial-level clusters were managed at the provincial offices of the respective responsible sectors or attached to the Provincial Command Centre, or the Pusdalops. The first few weeks of provincial-level coordination were considered a *"coordination vacuum"*[67], in which non-traditional civil society-led coordination mechanisms flourished, primarily through the use of *Whatsapp* groups.[68]

Whilst there was active participation by local and national civil society in coordination at the Jakarta and Palu levels, respondents felt there was a gap in local and national civil society leadership in coordination, which presents opportunities for further strengthening the role of non-government actors in coordination fora.

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[65] Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team After-Action Review

[66] Interview 32

[67] Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team After-Action Review, p. 11

[68] Humanitarian Advisory Group and Pujiono Centre, Charting The New Norm? Local Leadership in the first 100 days of the Sulawesi Earthquake Response (2018)

INGOs, national and local NGOs have for several years proceeding Sulawesi been aligning and developing roles and competence around the cluster approach, aligned with the Humanitarian Country Team. As was seen in Sulawesi, the coordination leadership assumed by the government under the national response system weakened linkages to the HCT, creating confusion for civil society. Further, there is an emergence of national NGOs that don't have a humanitarian mandate, but are increasingly engaged in the humanitarian space, particularly those that are Islam faith based. Many of these emerging actors are not linked with, or do not understand, the coordination architecture.

Without any umbrella organisation at the national level, coordination amongst humanitarian NGOs in Indonesia is fragmented, which was evident in Sulawesi. This was both problematic in the response as there was an absence of shared local civil society perspective, and confusion amongst agencies on where they stand in the shifting humanitarian landscape in Indonesia. There is an opportunity to better situate localisation both amongst NGOs themselves as well as within the current government policy environment and coordination with international actors.

Table 3 below gives a snapshot of coordination levels, challenges and future opportunities.

Table 3: Challenges and opportunities in coordination

Localising layers of coordination		
Level	**Challenges**	**Opportunities**
Regional	• The distinction between the AHA Centre's and OCHA's roles was confusing for many actors • The AHA Centre lacks strong connections with civil society in Indonesia • International actors, unclear on the role of the AHA Centre vis-a-vis OCHA, saw it as another hoop to jump through	• Regional dialogue, which includes local actors, on the interoperability of the AHA Centre and UN OCHA and ensuring an enabling environment for localisation • Capacity strengthening for Indonesian actors to support coordination and to better engage with ERAT and UNDAC missions • Establishing a clear policy and operational guidance outlining regional coordination modalities and methods of socialisation amongst key stakeholders including national civil society

National	• National coordination mechanisms were multiple and complex, involving BNPB, sectoral ministries and agencies and the military on one hand, and the shifting roles of UN OCHA and AHA Centre in the other • Cluster formation and composition was inconsistent, with some clusters 'too active'[69], which was confusing for actors following sector-based coordination norms	• International and national actors collectively advocate for critical examination of the HCT and ICCG and identify coordination mechanisms to strengthen local leadership • Unify and strengthen civil society coordination mechanisms for humanitarian actors • National and provincial cluster architecture to be clarified and supported to broaden functionality from information sharing to enhanced effective response, joint assessment, strategic planning and accountability • Increased international support and resource for national cluster leadership capacity
Provincial	• Coordination was slow to begin • Provincial coordination not seen as strategic or facilitating joint response, rather being perceived to be useful for information sharing only • Local actors not experienced in response did not understand the mechanisms or value of coordination, and in many cases faced difficulties in attending cluster meetings	• Capacity strengthening for provincial level cluster leads on their functions and responsibilities • Capacity strengthening for local actors on the cluster architecture and importance of coordination • National NGOs to support local NGOs to understand coordination mechanisms and streamline the processes to help more productive attendance

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[69] The Displacement and Protection, under the leadership of MoSA, for instance, absorbed other sectors such as shelter, WASH, CCCM, Security, vulnerable group, GBV, child protection, psychosocial support, and later even the community engagement. Meanwhile the Economy and Early Recover clusters are almost invisible

Recommendations - *Coordination*

- International and national actors to continue to support nationally-led priorities for future developments of national and provincial disaster coordination architecture
- International actors to work with national apex organisations[70] and local actors to understand knowledge and capacity gaps in coordination, and plan to resource closing these gaps
- International actors to advocate for regional dialogue about the role of the AHA Centre vis a vis OCHA and support national level socialisation of arrangements amongst partners
- International actors to support national actor priorities to establish an alliance of humanitarian NGOs in peace time to undertake, among others, coordination of localisation efforts in Indonesia and consolidate perspectives of local and national actors

Capacity gaps and strengthening

Reflections on the support from international actors as part of DRA and SHO mechanisms to their local partners were largely positive, as evidenced by Figure 6 below, however there remains scope for increased capacity strengthening and opportunities for different approaches.

Perceptions on support for capacity building under DRA and SHO partnerships

Provision of organisational support and capacity building

International

Very good	12.5%
Rather good	37.5%
Good	50%
Poor	0%

National

Very good	19.05%
Rather good	19.05%
Good	42.86%
Poor	9.52%

Figure 6: Perceptions of support for capacity building under DRA and SHO partnerships

Organisations with ongoing relationships had been undertaking a range of capacity-strengthening initiatives with their partners before the emergency, better equipping them for response in areas including disaster management, contingency planning, application of principles and standards and monitoring and evaluation. CRS (as an international NGO with a branch in Indonesia) is part of ERCB

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[70] for instance the National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction, Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, Indonesian Society for Disaster Management, and Rumah Zakat

network that at the same time delivered capacity-building support to the member of ERCB as well as to its local partners PKPU and Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre.[71]

In the aftermath of the disaster in Sulawesi, DRA and SHO organisations provided partners with capacity strengthening in wide-ranging areas including:

- rapid induction into humanitarian emergency response
- sector-specific planning and implementation
- emergency response management
- field safety and security
- joint need assessment/post disaster needs assessment
- Paket Pelayanan Awal Minimum (Initial Minimum Service Packages)
- Core Humanitarian Standards.

Broadly speaking, the capacity gaps and areas for further strengthening fell into two distinct categories. These were: 1) technical disaster management, as many of the local actors are not traditionally humanitarian agencies, and 2) organisational development. Table 4 below identifies the specific areas mentioned by local grassroots partners, which except a few, are not humanitarian NGOs, highlighting that although there is broad alignment under disaster management and organisational development, prioritisation should take an individual organisational approach to be most effective.

"To be successful, localisation requires field supports such as standard Operating procedures, protocols, or guidance."(national actor)[72]

Table 4: Areas identified for capacity strengthening of local actors

Technical Disaster Management	Organisational development
- Humanitarian principles - Sectoral/cluster coordination - Response to recovery transition 'Scaling up' from development programs to humanitarian response - Needs assessments and data collection - Monitoring and evaluation - Community engagement - Gender - Psychosocial and psychological first aid	- Development and implementation of MoUs - Organisational policy development and implementation - Administration - Reporting (narrative and financial) - Financial management - Human resource management - Logistics - Self-awareness and self-care for staff

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[71] Interview 2

[72] Interview 31

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In addressing these gaps there is a clear need for targeted support at the partner level, but there is a risk in multiple capacity assessments and plans being undertaken by multiple partners that do not align, which would possibly be a strain on national and local partners. To mitigate this, DRA and SHO organisations should work with their local partners on longer-term partnership approaches and to coordinate capacity development strategies, in line with DRA strategic commitments to localisation. Noting the acute mechanism is only 6 month activation, partners should seek alternate avenues to progress longer-term partnerships. There is scope for this coordination to extend beyond DRA and SHO partners, which would further benefit local actors in consolidating capacity development and holistically addressing identified needs. A consolidated approach to capacity building aligns with recommendations from the DEC RTRR Review.

Local actors that had pre-existing partnerships had greater humanitarian capability than local actors that were approached to partner at the time of the response. National organisations that had received capacity strengthening from international partners had even greater capacity. Most local organisations had not received capacity-strengthening support before the disaster as only a small number had previously engaged in humanitarian operations as those at the local level were for the most part development-focused organisations. There is an opportunity for national and international organisations to work with local partners to identify priorities for response specific capacity strengthening, however these approaches should be based on identified needs and priorities for local partners, not broadly applied.

Compared with local non-humanitarian organisations, national actors referenced capacity strengthening needs including support with managing large volumes of donor funding, mobilising of networks, clarification on localisation objectives, developing of local partner capacity, and enhanced coordination.

Recommendations – *Capacity Gaps and Capacity Strengthening*
- International organisations work with national and local partners on developing longer-term organisational capacity strengthening, rather than individual project or short-term initiatives
- International organisations to promote and coordinate on capacity strengthening initiatives and emergency preparedness to consortium and network partners
- International organisations. coordinate on joint approaches to strengthening local partner understanding and application of CHS, monitoring systems and feedback & complaints mechanisms.
- International and national humanitarian organisations in Indonesia progress dialogue on context-appropriate surge models, drawing on lessons from shared surge approaches
- National actors consider initiatives that build humanitarian capacity for local non-traditional humanitarian actors
- International organisations advocate for, and resource national and local actor humanitarian networks to broaden to ensure greater coverage of organisations with capacity and networks to support response

Conclusion

Sulawesi tested international humanitarian structures operational commitments towards locally-led response. The existence of consortia and networks amongst national and local partners, which had been built and strengthened in the years prior to the Sulawesi response, was integral in operationalising locally-led response. These arrangements – including several examples supported by member agencies of the DRA and SHO, such as JMK, ERCB and YEU – were able to rapidly mobilise through accessing seed funding, conducting joint assessments and brokering additional support across technical areas.

The role of international humanitarian financing continues to shift. There is scope for further advancements towards financing mechanisms that better support locally-led response, particularly with regards to the length of funding periods. Examples from Sulawesi showed the pressures put on local actors absorbing and programming short term funding from multiple international sources with different requirements, simultaneously. This was challenging for local and national actors. The emergence of regionally brokered support from other ASEAN nations and the swells of locally sourced funding to national actors throw into question the shifting role of international donors in future. Sulawesi showed that whilst progress has been made against commitments to increase funding to local partners, there is still room for improvement through better understanding the financial cost of downstream funding, and subsequently streamlining to ensure funding flows as directly as possible, or seeking alternate funding models that are accessible directly by national actors including promoting Good Humanitarian Donorship for the emerging Islamic-based financing organisations. There are also opportunities to consider country-based pooled funding accessible directly for national and local organisations.

The humanitarian coordination system in Indonesia is at a critical point whereby there is growing evidence and commitment for reform to better support local leadership. Key stakeholders, including the BNPB, OCHA, the HCT, the AHA Centre, civil society platforms and donors can leverage the lessons from Sulawesi to reshape coordination to align with the localisation agenda whilst avoiding repetition of the challenges.

Evidence from Sulawesi suggests strengthened humanitarian leadership at the national level, though demonstrates that there is a need to continue to focus on the last mile of localisation. National organisations should be further supported by donors and international partners to strengthen response preparedness capacity of the '*local local*' partner organisations especially non-humanitarian NGOs in disaster high-risk localities, and better coordinate approaches to capacity strengthening which focus on individual organisational needs and gaps.

Annex A – TOR

TOR for research into locally led response after the earthquake in Sulawesi

BACKGROUND

On 28 September 2018, a tsunami triggered by a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Indonesia's Central Sulawesi Province. The BNPB (the National Agency for Disaster Management) estimated that in the immediate weeks following the disaster, 4340 people died, 1,084 went missing, 4,400 sustained major injuries, and over 211,000 people were internally displaced. The earthquake caused widespread structural damage, displacing families temporarily from damaged and unsafe shelters. The disaster mainly affected Palu city, and the districts of Donggala and Sigi.

The impact of the earthquake and mortality was more extensive than originally estimated due to liquefaction, a rather unknown phenomena, that led to high mortality and displacement and loss of thousands of houses.

The disaster raised international attention especially due to the occurrence of a tsunami, which was the cause of one of the biggest disasters in the last century[73] and this provoked International fundraising activities and pledges for support. International and national organizations mobilized fast to provide emergency response in Sulawesi.

Responders included the Dutch relief Alliance[74] that used their acute response mechanism for a joint response Sulawesi and the SHO (Dutch cooperating aid agencies)[75] that starting a public fundraising campaign for Sulawesi.

Early on in the response, and according to their mandate, the national government of Indonesia (GOI) took a leading role. They decided to not allow international agencies and staff to enter the area to implement response. The BNPB (national disaster management authority) published a strong 8 point statement titled : regulations for international NGOs that aim to provide assistance in central Sulawesi

1. Foreign NGOs are not allowed to go directly to the field. All activities must be conducted in partnership with local partners.
2. Foreign citizens who are working with foreign NGOs are not allowed to conduct any activity on the sites affected by disaster.
3. Foreign NGO who already procured / prepared relief items in Indonesia need to register their assistance with the relevant ministries / agencies and mandated to work with local partners in distributing the aid.
4. If the respective NGOs have not registered their assistance with the relevant ministries /agencies they are asked to register with BNPB for the distribution to the affected population on the field.

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[73] the 2004 Tsunami hitting several Asian countries among them Indonesia's province Aceh

[74] The Dutch relief alliance (DRA) is a collaboration of 16 Dutch NGOs providing emergency response funded by the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs.

[75] The Dutch cooperating aid agencies are a collective of 14 Dutch organisations that organise public fundraising campaigns in the Netherlands in case of major disasters to generate funds for members response.

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5. Foreign agencies wishing to provide aid can do so through the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) with the guidance of the related ministries/agencies or local partners.
6. Foreign NGOs who have deployed foreign personnel are advised to retrieve their personnel immediately.
7. A monitoring of foreign volunteers is required.
8. The delivery of relief items are being coordinated temporarily by BNPB through Balikpapan.

International organizations that were registered already or had an MOU with GOI could implement but only in collaboration with local & national partners unless the GOI explicitly invited them to implement (directly?). The regulations of the BNPB are maintained to date putting emphasis on national and local responders (local govmt, Red Cross/PMI , national & local NGOs) in the response. The GOI had already communicated a similar regulation in a previous disaster, the earthquake in Lombok earlier in 2018 but the difference was that in this disaster GPU declared they had the capacity and also did not need foreign resources. In the Sulawesi GOI were open to receive funding support.

RATIONALE for the study: Sulawesi an example of locally led response?

Since 2016, the WHS and Grand Bargain[76] and related initiatives as the Charter for Change (C4C) have put localization of humanitarian response on the agenda. Localization refers to a stronger role for local responders, increased leadership of local responders (locally led responses) and increased humanitarian financing as directly as possible to local actors with the purpose to increase effectivity of humanitarian assistance.

The Sulawesi response is currently discussed an example of locally led response and potentially as an example of a locally led response that could inform response models elsewhere. It has generated a lot of interest among DRA stakeholders as an example to learn from – looking at what has worked well, what challenges have emerged, and what could be adopted – if anything – in other response contexts.

However, many stakeholders ask critical questions as well on the extent of leaderships of local actors questioning whether National government, UN and national branches of international agencies were still dominant and subcontracting to national and local actors, which replicates many of the inequities and inefficiencies of the dominant model. Additionally critical questions on implications for the quality of the response have been raised among others related to "a scramble for local partners" as a reaction to the regulation of the BNPB, putting pressure on local responders.

The DRA members are interested in gathering more information on whether and how the government restrictions lead to the international system partnering differently with local actors (INGO-LNNGO partnership models, donor govt-national govt support, UN, etc.) what worked well and what didn't, to enable local actors to respond effectively and exercise leadership over the different elements of the response.

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[76] The grand bargain is a commitment of humanitarian actors and donors to enhance effectivity of humanitarian aid (financing) It is includes commitment to provide more funding (25 % of humanitarian funding) as directly as possible to local responders.

The DRA overall strategy plan mentions localization as a major strategic objective and DRA has established a localization working group that monitors and supports localization efforts within the DRA. The Dutch government, donor of DRA, has committed to the Grand Bargain and is interested and requesting DRA to support localization.

Considering this, the DRA JR in collaboration with the localization working group DRA (guidance group) commissions this research.

Many DRA partners are also SHO members and the research will also engage SHO members not in DRA. Within SHO (partly overlap with DRA members) there has been discussion on (possible) implications of the GOI policy for members' response. As of yet most members indicated they were already working with national and local partners and did not find major challenges to support the humanitarian response. SHO emergency aid coordinators showed an interest in cooperating with research efforts that would provide more insight in the response in Sulawesi.

PURPOSE of the study:

This study is to collect data that will enable an **evidence based analysis and conclusions** as to what extent and on what aspects the Sulawesi response has been a locally led response, and what according to key local, national as well as international actors the major implications and challenges of the regulation of GOI, and ensuring response models, have been for effectiveness of the response.

Additional purpose is to **collect good practices and learnings** from the Sulawesi response that generate content to develop/ describe models of locally led responses that can be used to increase effectiveness of humanitarian response in the future.

Localisation is a key strategic priority in the DRA 2017-2012 strategic plan and is defined as "more effectively supporting locally led responses".   The goal of the DRA's localisation efforts is to contribute to more effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid. The DRA vision on localisation is characterised by the complementarity of different actors. (Putting local actors at the heart of humanitarian response, The Dutch relief alliance guidance note on localisation, August 2018)

The study will use the Dutch members of DRA and SHO, their local partners and networks as entry points for the study but will not limit data collection to DRA & SHO members. Findings of the research will be shared within the DRA and SHO, with C4C (charter for change) and the wider international humanitarian community.

The information collected will include local and (inter)national NGO, local and national government agencies and private sector on the response in central Sulawesi to ensure different perspectives are included. (DRA uses IASC HFTT definitions of local and international responders)

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

The study will focus on the first 6 months of the response from October 2018 to March 2019. The study will further interrogate areas that arose from the rapid analysis undertaken by Humanitarian Advisory Group and Pujiono Centre and will focus on the following specific objectives:

1. Provide insight into **funding flows and chains** starting with DRA and SHO organizations and depending on data availability a broader picture for response over the first 6 months, who funded which actor? Are there of locally-led funding? Do actors feel there were implications of the regulation for the financing of the response. Are there different perceptions of actors on preferred financing modalities?
2. How did international actors adapt to the GOI regulations? Are there innovative or best practice examples of support to locally-led response?
3. Did the **coordination** mechanisms at the regional, national, sub-national levels reflect or support locally led response? Were the coordination forums effective? What are the implications of the role of the AHA centre in the region vis a vis OCHA?
4. Describe and compare perspectives of different actors on the implications (positive and negative) of the GOI regulations on the overall quality of response (in as far as possible select informants that can compare with previous disasters in Indonesia) :
   - timeliness of the response
   - quality : technical (SPHERE or GOI guidance Perka BNPB 7/2008) and core humanitarian standards
   - accountability to donors and to beneficiaries
   - relationships with communities
5. What can be learned from different **partnership approaches** between actors? How did international actors work with national actors, both those with ongoing relationships and those establishing partnerships during the response. How do partnerships align with C4C Principles of Partnership? Were there examples of national-national or national-local partnerships? If so, what can we learn from these? What requirements were placed on national actors that were burdensome? Are there best-practice examples of equitable partnerships?
6. What **capacity gaps and capacity strengthening needs** of local actors were observed by local actors themselves and by international actors? How were they addressed or if not why were they not addressed? What capacity strengthening in humanitarian aid had local actors received previously and what do local actors list as their priority for CS for the future learning from this response.

Good practices and learnings for future responses should comprise part of the final report.

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study is to employ a mixed methods approach, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data should ensure statistical representativeness. A combination of the following methodologies is proposed:

1. Desk review: The desk review should include, at a minimum :
   - actors mapping based on WWW and other cluster or GOI information
   - funding flows
   - Review of partnership documentation
2. Survey (short and focused) among selected responders to collect quantitative data.
3. Semi structured Interviews and focus group discussions with key actors (list will be based on actor mapping) :

- national and local government depts (BNPB national level, district (bupati) and subdistrict
- cluster leads and other relevant formal or informal coordination mechanisms
- International, national and local NGOs with emergency response programming starting with DRAJR members and SHO members.
4. Collection of organization case study example/s of innovative approaches or good practice

DELIVERABLES AND TIMELINE

1. Inception report: to include details of methodology, tools and timeline/work plan for the assignment
2. Draft and final report(s), page limit (max 25 pages excluding annexes), executive summary (to include Methodology and limitations, summary of findings answering the above mentioned, key Recommendations)

Indicative Timescale with Deliverables:

16 days consultancy contract in the period March (contract date) up to 10 th of May 2019. Field work to be completed by end April 2019 (DRA JR ends 16 th of May 2019)

Phase	Deliverables	Time frame indication	Payments	Working days indication
Inception & instrument development phase	*Deliverable 1: short* final research proposal including budget, methodology and research tools including survey development	one week after contracting	30 % of total	2 days
Data collection and analysis	Desk review, skype interviews and field research Indonesia/Sulawesi	April 2019 (the current DRA response ends 15 th of May 2019		10 days (excluding travel days)
Report phase	*Deliverable 2:* Draft report in English for comment by DRA & selected SHO members.	Before 30 April 2019	30 % of total	3 days
	Deliverable 3: Final Report with comments reviewed and incorporated in as far as relevant	Before 15 May 2019	40 % of total	1 day
Total			**100%**	**16 Days** (excluding travel days)

REQUIREMENTS

DRA proposes this assignment to be conducted by a team of 2 consultants of which one is the team leader. There is strong preference for a team with an Indonesian consultant team leader and an international consultant in order to support good access to different networks, actors and perspectives.

DRA (and SHO) will provide contacts of members, their partners and networks.

Qualifications expected (combined) :
Minimum graduate degree in social sciences relevant for the assignment
Extensive experience in quantitative and qualitative research including in the humanitarian sector, experience with localization research or research on partnership is an asset.
Experience in working in a humanitarian organization , preferably also with local partners.
Up to date knowledge of an experience with the humanitarian system and recent discussions in the humanitarian sector on effectiveness of aid, Grand Bargain and localization debate.
Relevant network for the assignment is an asset.
Good communication skills in English (writing and speaking), at least one but preferably both consultants to be fluent in Bahasa.

EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST

Expressions of interest are requested from suitably qualified candidates and addressing the following:
- An outline of the proposed methodology to complete the assignment.
- Response to the criteria as set out in the 'consultant requirements'.
- Consultants daily rate and proposed budget for the study.
- CVs of consultants with professional referees and list of previous assignments completed.

Expressions of interest that do not cover these requirements will not be considered.
Deadline for submission of expressions of interest by 25 March 2019 COB

Submissions should be sent latest March 25 2019 COB to

Nicole Slootweg, CARE , JR lead DRA Sulawesi joint response : slootweg@carenederland.org
Inge Leuverink, co-chair localization working group DRA : ile@cordaid.org

Annex B – Funding analysis of DRA budget

Lead agency	CARE NL	Cordaid	Oxfam Novib	Plan International NL	Save the Children NL	Tearfund NL	World Vision NL	ZOA NL	Joint lead budget	Joint-lead budget
Total funding (EUR)	481,152	529,268	479,8	384,922	577,383	529,268	433,037	433,037	152,133	4,000,000
Total % received	12%	13%	12%	10%	14%	13%	11%	11%	4%	100%
EUR committed to local partners	46,631	74,234	186,73	10,365		449,873		173,569	0	941,402
%	10%	14%	39%	3%	0%	85%	0%	40%		24%
of the 24% who contributed what %	5%	8%	20%	1%	0%	48%	0%	18%	0%	

Annex C – SHO Funding Flows

Internationale koepel : International umbrella organisation
Veldkantoor = Field office of the INGO
Zusterorganisatie = Sisterorganisation (INGO within their federation or specific consortium)

Annex D – Resource List

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